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Case No. 20150996-SC
IN THE

UTAH SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
v.

RYAN MOOERS AND DARRON LAVEN BECKER,
Defendants/Petitioners.

Brief of Respondent
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This case is before the Court on a writ of certiorari to the Utah Court
of Appeals in State v. Mooers, 2015 UT App 266, 362 P.3d 282, and State v.
Becker, 2015 UT App 304, 365 P.3d 173 (Addendum A).

This Court

consolidated the cases pursuant to rule 3(b), Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure. The Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3102(5) (West Supp. 2015).

INTRODUCTION
After Mooers burglarized a home and Becker struck his neighbor
with a shovel, they negotiated pleas in abeyance with the State to avoid
convictions and sentences for felonies. In return, Mooers and Becker had
only to attend a class, pay a fee, and pay restitution to their victims. Their

plea in abeyance agreements did not specify a sum certain for restitution,
but left that determination to the trial court.
Mooers and Becker ultimately disagreed with the trial courts’
restitution determinations and appealed to the court of appeals. The court
of appeals dismissed Mooers’s and Becker’s appeals, holding that because
their pleas in abeyance were not final orders, the court lacked jurisdiction to
consider them.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Did the court of appeals err in holding that it lacked jurisdiction to
consider Mooers’s and Becker’s direct appeals from restitution entered as
conditions of their non-final pleas in abeyance?
Standard of Review. Whether appellate jurisdiction exists is a question
of law reviewed for correctness. Gailey v. State, 2016 UT 35, ¶8, __ Utah
Adv. Rep. __.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules are
reproduced in Addendum B:
 Utah R. App. P. 3 (appeal as of right)
 Utah R. App. P. 5 (discretionary appeals from interlocutory
orders)
 Utah R. Civ. P. 54 (judgments)
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 Utah Code Annotated § 77-2a-1 (West Supp. 2012) (plea in
abeyance definitions)
 Utah Code Annotated § 77-2a-2 (West Supp. 2012) (plea in
abeyance terms)
 Utah Code Annotated § 77-2a-3 (West Supp. 2012) (entry of plea
in abeyance)
 Utah Code Annotated § 77-2a-4 (West Supp. 2012) (violation of
plea in abeyance)
 Utah Code Annotated § 77-18a-1 (West Supp. 2012) (appeals—
when proper)
 Utah Code Annotated § 77-38a-102 (West Supp. 2012) (crime
victims restitution act definitions)
 Utah Code Annotated § 77-38a-302 (West Supp. 2012) (restitution
criteria)
 Utah Code Annotated § 77-38a-401 (West Supp. 2012) (entry of
restitution judgment)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE1
A. State v. Mooers.
1. Summary of facts.
One November, a family went on a week-long vacation. See mR.2.
When they returned, they discovered that their home had been burglarized.
See mR.2; mR.138:14. The burglars had entered the home through daughter
Randi’s bedroom window, scattering “glass everywhere.” mR.138:5, 13-14.
Because this case has been consolidated by the Court’s order, there
are two records on appeal: the record of State v. Mooers and the record of
State v. Becker. To avoid confusion, the State cites to the record in Mooers as
mR.__ and the record in Becker as bR.__.
1
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Randi’s carpet had been torn and ripped from the broken window glass and
her belongings were strewn around. See mR.128:6; mR.138:8. Several of the
family’s items were missing from throughout the home. See mR.138:8, 13.
The family estimated that the burglars had stolen $3,200 in jewelry and
coins. See mR.2.
After the break-in, Randi “was terrified” and “didn’t feel safe
anymore.”

mR.138:7, 16.

She became withdrawn, would “shake,” and

experienced nightmares. mR.138:16. And if someone “walked into the
room unexpectedly,” she would “jump halfway out of her skin.”
mR.138:17.
Randi was also too afraid to sleep in her bedroom and she began
sleeping on the couch. See mR.138:8, 15. Randi, in fact, would not go into
her bedroom at all except to “grab [her] clothes in the morning” and only if
her mother accompanied her. Id. at 11, 15.
Approximately one month after the break-in, Randi’s parents decided
that “the only thing [they] could do” to ease Randi’s distress was to install
security bars on her window. mR.138:16; mR.132 n.2. Indeed, after the
security bars were installed, Randi “got much better.” mR.138:17. She “felt
safer” and returned to sleeping in her own bedroom. mR.138:9.
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After an investigation, Mooers and a co-defendant were charged for
their involvement in the break-in.

See mR.1-2, mR.138:2.

Mooers was

charged with burglary, a second degree felony, and theft, a third degree
felony. See mR.1-2.
Mooers negotiated a plea in abeyance agreement with the State.
According to the agreement, Mooers agreed to plead guilty to third-degreefelony theft, and the State would dismiss the more serious burglary charge.
See mR.15, 24; mR.137:1. The trial court would hold the plea in abeyance for
18 months. See id. If Mooers successfully fulfilled certain plea in abeyance
conditions, the theft charge would also be dismissed and Mooers would not
have any conviction.

See mR.137:5-6; Utah Code Annotated §77-2a-3(2)

(West Supp. 2012).
As conditions of his plea in abeyance, Mooers agreed to complete a
theft class, pay a $200 fee, and pay restitution jointly and severally with his
co-defendant. See mR.15, 24; mR.137:5-6; mR.138:1-2. The plea in abeyance
agreement did not provide how much restitution Mooers would be required
to pay. Instead it stated that the State would “submit” its figure to the trial
court within 90 days of Mooer’s plea. See mR.137:5; mR.15, 24.
At his plea hearing, Mooers admitted that he “aided others in
entering a home and taking coin[s] and jewelry worth between $1,500 and
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$5,000.” mR.22; mR.137:3. The trial court accepted Mooer’s plea, but did
not enter it, instead holding it in abeyance for 18 months.

See mR.15;

mR.137:5. Following the terms of the plea in abeyance agreement, the trial
court ordered Mooers to complete a theft class, pay a fee, and pay
restitution jointly and severally with his co-defendant. mR.137:6; mR.15.
The trial court “g[a]ve the State 90 days to determine the restitution”
amount. mR.137:6. The trial court advised Mooers that if he failed to fulfill
these conditions, it “would mean you would come back here and the guilty
plea would be entered and you would be sentenced.” mR.137:5.
Following the plea hearing, the State requested $5,760.50 in
restitution—about $260 more than Mooers had already admitted he owed.
See mR.38, 110-127. Of this amount, $4,660.50 was for the value of the stolen
jewelry and coins, repairing Randi’s broken window, and replacing Randi’s
damaged carpet.

See mR.116-125, 131.

The remaining $1,100 was for

installing security bars on Randi’s bedroom window. See id.
Mooers objected to restitution for the security bars, asserting that they
were not “‘pecuniary damages’ resulting from Defendant’s ‘criminal
activity’” as required by the Crime Victims Restitution Act. mR.71;
mR.128:4-7, 11-12 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201).
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The trial court disagreed.

See mR.131-135.

After an evidentiary

hearing and considering both oral and written argument, it ordered Mooers
to pay “for all of the pecuniary damages arising from the break-in,”
“including the installation of security bars.” mR.135.
Mooers appealed the trial court’s restitution award for the security
bars. See mR.101.
2. The court of appeals’ decision.
In a unanimous opinion, the court of appeals held that it lacked
jurisdiction to consider Mooers’s appeal. See State v. Mooers, 2015 UT App
266, ¶¶10, 19, 362 P.3d 282 (Addendum A). While the court agreed that
defendants, “as a matter of right,” may appeal a final judgement of
conviction, it recognized that under well-established precedent, “a plea in
abeyance is neither a sentence nor a final judgment, and therefore does not
give rise to a right to appeal.” Id. at ¶¶8, 10 (citing Meza v. State, 2015 UT 70,
359 P.3d 592; State v. Moss, 921 P.2d 1021 (Utah App. 1996); State v. Millward,
2014 UT App 174, 332 P.3d 400; Salzl v. Department of Workforce Servs., 2005
UT App 399, 122 P.3d 691; State v. Hunsaker, 933 P.2d 415 (Utah App. 1997)
(per curiam)).
The court of appeals further rejected Mooers’s contention that a
restitution order—entered as a condition of a plea in abeyance—is

-7-

independently appealable. Id. at ¶¶11-17. To the extent that State v. Gibson,
2009 UT App 108, 208 P.3d 543, or Meza v. State, 2015 UT 70, 359 P.3d 592,
suggested such a right, the court of appeals dismissed its language as nonbinding dicta because neither case addressed whether a restitution order
entered as a condition of a plea in abeyance was directly appealable. See id.
at ¶¶12-14 (explaining that Gibson reviewed trial court’s denial of motion to
withdraw guilty plea and Meza addressed whether successfully completed
plea in abeyance agreement is treated as conviction for purposes of PostConviction Remedies Act).
Recognizing that statutes which treat pleas in abeyance as convictions
do so only “explicitly,” the court of appeals also determined that the Crime
Victims Restitution Act did not create a right to directly appeal a restitution
order entered as a condition of a plea in abeyance agreement. Id. at ¶15.
The Act’s provision that a restitution order be “‘considered a legal
judgment, enforceable under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure’” did not
create such a right because it “does not refer to the right to appeal, nor does
it indicate that a restitution order is considered a conviction for purposes of
appeal.”

Id. at ¶¶16-17 (quoting Utah Code Annotated § 77-38a-401(2)

(LexisNexis 2012)). Instead, this provision simply created a mechanism for
victims to enforce the payment of restitution. Id. at ¶17.
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The court of appeals finally noted that defendants who are ordered to
pay restitution as a condition of a plea in abeyance are not without an
avenue for seeking appellate review. Id. at ¶18. It observed that they can
request interlocutory review pursuant to rule 5, Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure or they can request extraordinary relief under rule 65B of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Id.
B.

State v. Becker.
1. Summary of facts.
Angry that his neighbor Mr. Turner’s dogs were off-leash, Becker ran

after Mr. Turner with a shovel, yelling obscenities and threatening to kill
him. See bR.2, 73, 79. Becker hit Mr. Turner with the shovel twice—once in
the throat and once in the head. See bR.2, 73, 82. Becker then pinned Mr.
Turner against a fence. See bR.74, 76, 77. Mr. Turner escaped only after
neighbors intervened. See bR.74, 82.
A responding officer noted that Mr. Turner had injuries on the top of
his head as well as scratches and marks on his neck and a bleeding cut on
his hand.

See bR.2, 81.

As the officer placed Becker under arrest, he

continued to yell about Mr. Turner and his dogs. See bR.2, 82.
Becker was charged with aggravated assault, a third degree felony.
See bR.1. Like Mooers, Becker negotiated a plea in abeyance with the State.
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Becker agreed to plead guilty to attempted aggravated assault, a class A
misdemeanor, with the understanding that the trial court would hold the
plea in abeyance for 24 months. See bR. 26, 28; bR.99:6. In return, Becker
agreed to complete an anger management class and to pay the victim
restitution.

bR.28; bR.99:2.

If Becker successfully complied with these

conditions, the charge against him would be dismissed. bR.99:5.
While Becker and the State did not agree to a final sum for restitution,
the State gave Becker a copy of a letter Mr. Turner had written requesting
restitution for $1,143: $39 for a vision exam, $624 for pair of replacement
eyeglasses, and $480 for lost wages. See bR.68; bR.99:2, 10; bR.95:5, 8-9.
At the plea hearing, Becker admitted that he had “attempted to hit his
neighbor with the handle of a shovel during an argument regarding some
loose dogs.” bR.99:7-8. He confirmed that the plea in abeyance agreement
required him to complete an anger management course and to pay the
victim restitution. See bR.99:2.
When the trial court expressed concern about accepting a plea in
abeyance agreement that did not include a restitution amount, Becker
affirmed that the plea in abeyance agreement required him to pay full
restitution.

See bR.99:2.

He further agreed that the trial court would

determine the final restitution amount and he would be required to pay it,
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even if he ultimately disagreed with the trial court’s determination. See
bR.99:2-3, 9 (Becker affirming trial court’s statement that “everyone
understands the payment of restitution as ordered by this court . . . will be
one of the conditions . . . [e]ven if Mr. Becker ultimately disagrees with what
that is”).
The trial court accepted Becker’s plea, held it in abeyance for 24
months, and ordered him to complete an anger management course and to
“pay full restitution.” bR.21; bR.99:8-10.
Following the plea hearing, the State submitted a motion for
restitution, requesting $663.01—a little over half the original estimate
because it did not seek restitution for Mr. Turner’s lost wages. See bR.32;
bR.95:5-6. The State included a “Subrogation Notice” for the Utah Office for
Victims of Crime (UOVC).

See bR.34-37.

The documents itemized the

$663.01 to show that the UOVC had paid the victim $39.00 and $624.01 for
“Medically Necessary Device[s].”

bR.36. The documents also included

Becker’s name, the date and address of the assault, the police report
number, the responding officer’s name, the victim’s name, the third district
court’s case number, and the UOVC claim number. See bR.35-37.
Becker objected to the State’s restitution request. See bR.38, 42. At a
subsequent hearing, Becker argued that the UOVC’s documents were

-11-

insufficient because they did not state what the “medically necessary
device” was or “who provided the services.”

bR.95:4-5.

Although

subpoenaed, Mr. Turner did not appear at the hearing. See bR.95:6.
The State explained that the “medically necessary device[s]” were for
Mr. Turner’s $39 vision exam and $624 pair of replacement eyeglasses.
bR.95:5-6; bR.68. The State presented Mr. Turner’s letter to the trial court.
See id.
Becker, however, insisted that the UOVC must have had “additional
information.” R.95:8. He asked for another hearing so that he could “try to
obtain that information.” R.95:11. While the trial court believed that “on its
face this appears to be a proper restitution claim,” it ordered another
hearing to give Becker “some time to see if in fact this is not what it claims
to be.” R.95:17. But the trial court cautioned that “I am not going to have a
hearing where I second-guess whether or not [the UOVC] should have paid
that . . . .” bR.95:12. Instead, the hearing would address only whether there
was “sufficient documentation to connect it to this criminal conduct.” Id.
The court explained that unless Becker came up with something that
undercut the UOVC’s decision to reimburse Mr. Turner, it planned to order
restitution in the amount of $663.01. See id.
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Before the second restitution hearing, Becker served the UOVC with a
subpoena duces tecum. See bR.45-46. The UOVC responded with
documents showing that it had reimbursed the victim for an eye exam and
eyeglasses, but the documents were “no more in detail than what” it had
already provided. bR.96:4.
At the second restitution hearing, Becker argued once again that the
State’s request for restitution lacked evidentiary foundation because “the
only thing that’s formal” was the UOVC’s notice that it had paid the victim
$663.01 for unspecified “medically necessary device[s].” bR.96:5. Becker
further argued that the State had not shown a causal nexus between his
criminal conduct and Mr. Turner’s economic loss because Becker “did not
admit to any conduct that would result in damages to Mr. Turner’s eye or
his eyeglasses . . . .” bR.96:5.
The trial court rejected Becker’s arguments and granted the State’s
motion for restitution in the amount of $663.01. See bR.84; bR.96:14. Becker
appealed. See bR.91.2

On May 6, 2016, the trial court ordered Becker to appear and show
cause why his plea in abeyance should not be terminated, judgment of
conviction be entered, and his sentence be imposed. A hearing is scheduled
for August 8, 2016. See Third Judicial District court docket, case number
131902981.
2
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2. The court of appeals’ decision.
The court of appeals also dismissed Becker’s appeal for lack of
jurisdiction. See State v. Becker, 2015 UT App 304, 365 P.3d 173 (Addendum
A).

Following Mooers, it concluded that because “Becker has not been

sentenced and a conviction has not yet been entered against him, there is no
final order from which Becker may appeal.” Id. at ¶9.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The court of appeals correctly dismissed Mooers’s and Becker’s
appeals because it did not have jurisdiction to consider them. For direct
appeals, Utah appellate courts have jurisdiction to review only final
judgments or orders. The restitution orders here were not final. Rather,
they were conditions of pleas in abeyance—which by design and for
defendants’ benefits are not final judgments because neither judgments of
conviction nor sentences are entered.
While in a typical case, a restitution order may be appealed
independently of conviction and sentence, this is not true in the plea in
abeyance context.

This is because restitution orders become part of a

convicted defendant’s sentence—the final judgment—but in the plea in
abeyance context, a defendant has been neither convicted nor sentenced.
And the reasoning for allowing convicted defendants to independently
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appeal restitution orders does not apply in the plea in abeyance context—
there is no appeal that would otherwise be delayed by awaiting a final
restitution order.
But defendants like Mooers and Becker are not without an avenue of
appellate review.

Indeed, defendants may seek interlocutory review of

restitution orders imposed as conditions of pleas in abeyance.

And if

interlocutory review is foreclosed by law, they may seek extraordinary relief
under rule 65B, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Moreover, they may always
appeal as a matter of right if their pleas in abeyance are terminated and
their convictions become final.
This is fair. Mooers and Becker negotiated the terms of their plea in
abeyance agreements.

And in doing so, they were guaranteed the

opportunity to avoid criminal penalties to which they would have
otherwise been subject.

ARGUMENT
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY DISMISSED
MOOERS’S AND BECKER’S APPEALS BECAUSE UTAH’S
APPELLATE COURTS DO NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO
CONSIDER NON-FINAL ORDERS ON DIRECT APPEAL
Mooers and Becker argue that “the court of appeals erred in
concluding that it lacked jurisdiction over [the] direct appeals of their
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restitution orders.” Br.Pet. 9 (capitalization removed). They contend that a
restitution order is always final—and thus appealable as a matter of right—
even when it is entered as a condition of a non-final plea in abeyance
agreement. See Br.Pet. 9-19. And while Mooers and Becker concede that
defendants can seek discretionary review of non-final orders, they contend
that such review is inadequate because it “would either come too late or not
at all.” Br.Pet. 19-20.
The court of appeals correctly held that it lacked jurisdiction to
consider Mooers’s and Becker’s appeals because their restitution orders are
not final judgments. Rather, they are conditions of Mooers’s and Becker’s
plea in abeyance agreements—which by their very nature are not final.
Appellate courts cannot act without a grant of jurisdiction. And there is
none granting an appeal as of right here.

But discretionary review is

eminently reasonable for pleas in abeyance; Mooers and Becker negotiated
the terms of their agreements and received the benefit of the possibility of
having no conviction or sentence if they successfully fulfill the terms of
those agreements.
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A. A restitution order imposed as a condition of a plea in
abeyance is not appealable as a matter of right because it is
not a final order.
Under the Utah Constitution, criminal defendants have “‘the right to
appeal in all cases.’” State v. Clark, 2011 UT 23, ¶6, 251 P.3d 829 (quoting
Utah Const. art. I, § 12). But this right is not absolute. Rather, the right to
appeal “must be positively recognized by statute or a constitutional
provision.” Id. See also State v. Harrison, 2011 UT 74, ¶8, 269 P.3d 133, 136
(same); State v. Taylor, 664 P.2d 439, 441 (Utah 1983) (“Appellate jurisdiction
. . . may exist by virtue of a constitutional grant or by statute.”); State v.
Olsen, 115 P. 968, 969 (Utah 1911) (“[T]he right of appeal is purely statutory
and exists only when given by some constitutional or statutory provision.”).
As relevant here, a criminal defendant’s right to a direct appeal lies only in
final judgments. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-1(1) (West 2012) (providing
that “defendant may, as a matter of right, appeal from . . . a final judgment
of conviction, whether by verdict or plea”); Utah R. App. P. 3 (“An appeal
may be taken from a district or juvenile court to the appellate court with
jurisdiction over the appeal from all final orders and judgments”). For
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everything else, the defendant may appeal only by permission. §77-18a1(2).3
Likewise, appellate court jurisdiction is conferred by statute or
constitutional provision. See Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, ¶35 n.6, 100 P.3d
1177 (“‘[S]ubject matter jurisdiction . . . is the authority granted through
constitution or statute to adjudicate a class of cases or controversies.’”). See
also Clark, 2011 UT 23, ¶6 (same); Harrison, 2011 UT 74, ¶8 (same); Taylor,
664 P.2d at 441 (same).

Indeed, appellate courts “‘cannot conjure

jurisdiction.’” State v. Collins, 2014 UT 61, ¶21, 342 P.3d 789 (quoting State v.
Lara, 2005 UT 70, ¶10, 124 P.3d 234).
For direct appeals, appellate courts have jurisdiction to hear it only if
it is taken from a final judgment or order. See Loffredo v. Holt, 2001 UT 97,
¶¶10, 15, 37 P.3d 1070. An order is final only if it disposes of the case as to
all parties and “finally dispose[s] of the subject-matter of the litigation on
the merits of the case.”

Bradbury v. Valencia, 2000 UT 50, ¶9, 5 P.3d

There is a statutory right to appeal other orders that this appeal does
not implicate. See Utah Code Annotated § §77-18a-1(b) through (d). There
is also an exception to the final judgment rule for direct appeals that does
not apply here. Utah’s appellate courts may have jurisdiction to consider a
direct appeal from a nonfinal order if there are multiple parties and
multiple claims and the appellant satisfies the criteria of rule 54(b), Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure. See Loffredo v. Holt, 2001 UT 97, ¶15, 37 P.3d 1070.
3
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649 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). See also State ex rel.
J.M.S., 2010 UT App 326, ¶12, 246 P.3d 1188 (holding that order removing
children from father’s custody was not final, appealable order because
“further judicial proceedings are required to determine [children’s] ultimate
placement” and father still had chance to regain custody). “In a criminal
case, it is ‘the sentence itself which constitutes a final judgment from which
the appellant has the right to appeal.’” State v. Bowers, 2002 UT 100, ¶4, 57
P.3d 1065 (quoting State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1978)) (emphasis
in original).4
By design and for the defendant’s benefit, a trial court’s order
accepting a plea in abeyance is not a final judgment because neither a
judgment of conviction nor a sentence is entered. See Utah Code Ann. § 772a-2(1) (West Supp. 2012) (providing that court will “hold the plea in
abeyance and not enter judgment of conviction against the defendant nor
impose sentence upon the defendant”).

Instead, the trial court holds a

guilty or no contest plea in “abeyance” “on condition that the defendant
comply with specific conditions as set forth in a plea in abeyance
agreement.” Utah Code Ann. § 77-2a-1 (West Supp. 2012). One condition a
As discussed in subpoint I.B below, appellate courts also have
jurisdiction to hear appeals of non-final orders, but only when they grant
defendants permission to appeal.
4
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plea in abeyance may require is that the defendant pay restitution. See Utah
Code Ann. § 77-2a-3(5) (providing that “terms of a plea in abeyance
agreement may include: . . . (b) an order that the defendant pay restitution
to the victims of the defendant’s actions”).
If the defendant successfully fulfills his plea in abeyance conditions—
including paying restitution—the trial court may either “reduce the degree
of offense and enter judgment of conviction and impose sentence” or “allow
withdrawal of defendant’s plea and order the dismissal of the case.” Utah
Code Ann. § 77-2a-3(2) (West. Supp. 2012).

If the defendant does not

successfully fulfill the plea in abeyance conditions, the trial court “may
terminate the agreement and enter judgment of conviction and impose
sentence against the defendant for the offense to which the original plea was
entered.” Utah Code Ann. § 77-2a-4 (West Supp. 2012).
As the court of appeals has explained, a plea in abeyance does not
result in a final judgment unless and until a conviction is entered or the case
is dismissed:
a plea in abeyance anticipates further action by the trial court,
and accordingly is not final. In other words, the case remains
open until the trial court takes further action to either enter a
conviction for the pleaded-to crime or a lesser crime, or
dismisses the case. Until that time, the case is in limbo and the
defendant’s status is unresolved.
State v. Turnbow, 2001 UT App 59, ¶17, 21 P.3d 249.
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Consequently, the “law is well-settled that, because there has been no
final judgment, a direct appeal cannot be taken from a plea in abeyance
agreement.” State v. Millward, 2014 UT App 174, ¶2, 332 P.3d 400 (quoting
State v. Comer, 2002 UT App 219, ¶14, 51 P.3d 55, cert. denied 59 P.3d 603).
See also Meza v. State, 2015 UT 70, ¶18, 359 P.3d 592 (“Had the Legislature
intended a plea in abeyance to constitute a conviction . . . it would have so
provided in the statute authorizing such pleas. But it did not. Rather, the
statute provides to the contrary.”); State v. Moss, 921 P.2d 1021, 1025 n.7
(Utah App. 1996) (“The plain language of these statutes reveals that a plea
in abeyance is not a final adjudication.”), cert. denied 929 P.2d 350. As a
result, defendants cannot take a direct appeal to contest the conditions of
their pleas in abeyance.
Here, there are no final judgments because neither Mooers nor Becker
have been convicted or sentenced.

See Utah Code Ann. § 77-2a-2(1).

Instead, the trial courts have entered orders accepting their plea in abeyance
agreements. See mR.15; bR.21; Utah Code Ann. § 77-2a-1. And if Mooers
and Becker fulfill the conditions of their plea in abeyance agreements—
including paying restitution—the trial courts may withdraw their pleas and
dismiss their cases.

See bR.99:5 (“If you do what is ordered as the

conditions of this plea in abeyance, ultimately that [charge] will be
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dismissed.”); Utah Code Ann. § 77-2a-3(2).

If they do not fulfill the

conditions, the trial court will enter judgments of conviction and sentence
them. See mR.137:5 (advising Mooer that if he failed to fulfill the conditions,
it “would mean you would come back here and the guilty plea would be
entered and you would be sentenced”). And in that case, they will have an
appeal of right.
One of the conditions in both Mooers’s and Becker’s plea in abeyance
agreements is that they pay restitution.

See mR.15; mR.137:5-6; bR.21;

bR.99:2-3, 9. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-2a-3(5) (providing that “an order that
the defendant pay restitution” is a “term [] of a plea in abeyance
agreement”) (emphasis added). But that is merely a condition for them to
avoid a final judgment or order. The court of appeals thus correctly held
that it lacked jurisdiction to consider Mooers’s and Becker’s direct appeals.
1. A restitution order entered as a condition of a plea in
abeyance is not a separate, final order.
Although pleas in abeyance are not final, Mooers and Becker contend
that a restitution order is always final and directly appealable, even when it
is imposed as a condition of a non-final plea in abeyance agreement. See
Br.Pet. 9-19. In support, they rely on State v. Gibson, 2009 UT App 108, 208
P.3d 543, and Meza v. State, 2015 UT 70, 359 P.3d 592.
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Neither case,

however, supports the proposition that a restitution order imposed as a
condition of a plea in abeyance is directly appealable.
It is true that in a typical case, a restitution order is final and
separately appealable. See Salt Lake City v. Ausbeck, 2011 UT App 269, ¶4
n.2, 274 P.3d 991; Dolan v. United States, 560 U.S. 605, 618 (2010) (observing
that “it is not surprising to find instances where a defendant has appealed
from the entry of a judgment containing an initial sentence [and also] . . .
from a later order setting forth the final amount of restitution”). But this is
because when a defendant is convicted (either by verdict or by pleading
guilty or no contest), restitution becomes part of his sentence—the final
judgment against him. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(1) (providing that
“in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court shall order that
the defendant make restitution”) (emphasis added); State v. Garner, 2005 UT
6, ¶17, 106 P.3d 729 (explaining that restitution order is part of sentence).
In a plea in abeyance, however, the restitution order cannot be part of
the defendant’s sentence because he has not been—and may never be—
sentenced. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-2a-2 (providing that court will “hold
the plea in abeyance and not enter judgment of conviction against the
defendant nor impose sentence upon the defendant”).

Instead, the

restitution order is simply a non-final condition of his plea in abeyance
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agreement, the successful completion of which will usually mean there will
be no judgment against the defendant at all. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-2a3(5) (providing that “an order that the defendant pay restitution” is a “term
[] of a plea in abeyance agreement”) (emphasis added).
A convicted defendant may separately appeal a restitution order that
is part of his sentence because restitution may not be determined for up to
one year after sentencing—outside the time usually allotted to file an appeal
from a final judgment. See Utah Code Annotated § 77-38a-302(2)(b) (West
Supp. 2012) (providing that trial court shall determine restitution “as part of
the criminal sentence at the time of sentencing or within one year after
sentencing”).5 It thus “makes sense” to permit a convicted defendant to
immediately proceed to direct appeal on his claims about his conviction and
sentence and separately appeal any complaints about his restitution order.
Dolan, 560 U.S. at 618. “[O]therwise,” his appeal would be delayed and he
“would be forced to wait . . . before seeking review of [his] conviction”—
indeed, up to one year. Id. See also Garner, 2005 UT 6, ¶¶15-16 (explaining

The current version of the Crime Victims Restitution Act has
removed this language, instead requiring the State to submit restitution
requests within one year after sentencing. See Utah Code Annotated § 7738a-302(5)(d)(i) (West 2016).
5
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that convicted defendants may separately appeal restitution order so as not
to “significantly delay[]” right to appeal).
But this concern does not apply in the plea in abeyance context. In
fact, because a recipient of a plea in abeyance has not been convicted, there
is no conviction for him to appeal. See Utah Code Annotated § 77-2a-2(1)
(West Supp. 2012) (providing that court will “hold the plea in abeyance and
not enter judgment of conviction against the defendant nor impose sentence
upon the defendant”). Only if he fails to successfully fulfill his plea in
abeyance conditions will the trial court enter judgment and conviction and
impose sentence. See Utah Code Annotated § 77-2a-3(2) (West Supp. 2012).
But this would be after his restitution condition has already been ordered,
not the other way around. See Utah Code Annotated § 77-2a-1 (West Supp.
2012) (providing that plea in abeyance conditions must be set forth in plea
in abeyance agreement).

Thus, the conundrum that justifies treating a

restitution order entered as part of a sentence—delaying the remainder of
the appeal—does not exist in a plea in abeyance because there is no appeal
that would otherwise be delayed by awaiting a final restitution order.
Mooers and Becker argue, however, that it “defies . . . logic” that a
defendant who has received a plea in abeyance must wait until after he has
been convicted and sentenced to receive direct review of this restitution
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condition. Br.Pet. 15. But this is true for any other condition of his plea in
abeyance agreement.

Because the plea had not been entered and no

sentence imposed, the plea itself is interlocutory.
interlocutory, so are its parts.

And if the whole is

Indeed, Mooers and Becker have not

shown—even argued—why restitution orders should be treated differently
than any other condition of a plea in abeyance agreement. While there is
much “at stake” in complying with a restitution condition, this is true for
every condition of a plea in abeyance agreement. Br.Pet. 14 (quotation
marks and citation omitted).

Each equally and independently puts the

defendant at risk of a criminal conviction and sentence if he does not
comply.6 Br.Pet. 14 (quotation marks and citation omitted). See e.g., State v.
Martin, 2012 UT App 208, ¶3, 283 P.3d 1066 (explaining that Martin failed to
fulfill plea in abeyance condition that he replace chain link fence and replant
elm tree and shrubs by “licensed third party”) (emphasis removed).

Many possible common conditions of a plea in abeyance—like
restitution—require the defendant to pay substantial monthly sums, such as
paying child support, paying for a “remedial or rehabilitative program,” or
maintaining a residence. Utah Code Annotated § 77-2a-3(5)(c) (West Supp.
2012). See also Utah Code Annotated § 77-2a-3(5)(d) (providing that plea in
abeyance may contain any condition that could be imposed as a condition of
probation).
6
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The court of appeals thus correctly concluded that Mooers’s and
Becker’s appeals were not final and the court accordingly had no
jurisdiction to consider them.
Other jurisdictions have come to the same conclusion. See In re T.C.,
210 Cal. App. 4th 1430, 1432-1433 (Cal. App. 2012) (dismissing direct appeal
of restitution order where juvenile court “deferred entry of judgment” and
observing juvenile could appeal if judgment is subsequently entered); State
v. Cameron, 81 P.3d 442, 444 (Kan. App. 2003) (dismissing appeal of
diversion agreement because it was not final judgment, which “requires
both a conviction and a sentence”); State v. Brown, 2012 WL 1521544U, *1-2
(La. App. 2012) (dismissing State’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction because
Brown had not been convicted where trial court deferred judgment); State v.
Castaldo, 638 A.2d 845, 848 (N.J. 1994) (holding that Castaldo had no “appeal
as of right” from restitution condition imposed in diversionary program
because defendants “may appeal from an adverse determination only after
judgment of conviction”); State v. Collins, 2008 WL 2579170U, *1-2 (Tenn.
App. 2008) (dismissing direct appeal of restitution order imposed as
condition of “judicial diversion” because there was no final judgment and
explaining proper avenue for appellate review was interlocutory review);
State v. Norris, 47 S.W. 3d 457, 461-463 (Tenn. App. 2000) (holding that
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appellant had no appeal of right when granted judicial diversion because
there was no final judgment); State v. Moore, 2009 WL 2342905U, *1 (Tenn.
App. 2009) (dismissing appeal for lack of jurisdiction from judicial diversion
where Moore contested whether interest could be awarded as part of
restitution); Quaglia v. State, 906 S.W.2d 112, 113 (Tex. App. 1995) (holding
that modification of terms of deferred adjudication are not directly
appealable); McLean v. State, 2011 WL 192719U (Tex. App. 2011) (per
curiam) (dismissing appeal for lack of jurisdiction from appeal of condition
of deferred adjudication).
The cases upon which Mooers and Becker rely—State v. Gibson and
Meza v. State—do not change this conclusion. In fact, neither supports the
proposition that a restitution order imposed as a condition of a plea in
abeyance agreement is directly appealable.
Gibson entered into a plea in abeyance agreement. See Gibson, 2009
UT App 108, ¶3. As here, one condition required her to pay restitution. See
id. Because “there was a dispute over the amounts” of restitution, the trial
court set the restitution amount after a hearing. See id. Gibson moved to
amend the court’s restitution order, but the trial court denied it. See id. at
¶4. The State later filed a motion for order to show cause why Gibson’s plea
in abeyance should not be terminated and judgment of conviction be
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entered because Gibson had failed to pay restitution as required. See id. at
¶5. Before hearing the State’s motion, Gibson filed a motion to withdraw
her guilty plea, arguing that her plea was not knowing or voluntary when
the restitution figure was uncertain at the time she pleaded guilty. See id. at
¶6. The trial court denied her motion. See id. The court then heard the
State’s motion for order to show cause and terminated Gibson’s plea in
abeyance agreement, entered her guilty plea, and sentenced her. See id. at
¶7.

Gibson timely appealed the trial court’s denial of her motion to

withdraw her guilty plea. See id.
The court of appeals affirmed, holding that Gibson’s plea had been
knowing and voluntary. See id. at ¶¶11-15. In its discussion, the court
noted that Gibson had the right to a restitution hearing “and also ha[d] the
right to appeal the resulting determination,” and “ultimately chose not to
exercise her right to appeal the district court’s denial of her motion to
amend.” Id. at ¶15.

In a footnote, it stated that the “Crime Victims

Restitution Act specifies that a judgment under that act has the same effect
as an ordinary judgment.” ¶15 n.5 (citing Utah Code Annotated § 77-38a401(4)).
These statements do not support the proposition that Gibson could
have directly appealed the trial court’s restitution determination before her
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plea in abeyance was terminated and her conviction was entered. Gibson
could directly appeal the trial court’s restitution determination because she
was convicted and sentenced. Indeed, all interlocutory orders become final
once a defendant has been sentenced.

See Bowers, 2002 UT 100, ¶4

(explaining that sentence in criminal case “constitutes a final judgment from
which the appellant has the right to appeal”). And once there is a final
judgment, a defendant may appeal any error in the criminal process, as long
as it is procedurally proper. The Gibson court thus correctly noted that
Gibson could have claimed error in the trial court’s restitution
determination in her present appeal.

Cf. Comer, 2002 UT App 219, ¶14

(dismissing defendant’s appeal from plea in abeyance without prejudice
and recognizing that he could raise same claims of error should judgment
become final).
Neither does Gibson’s observation that restitution orders have the
same effect as an ordinary civil judgment turn an interlocutory restitution
condition into a final judgment that is appealable as a matter of right. As
stated, Gibson’s plea in abeyance had been terminated, her conviction had
been entered, and she had been sentenced. Gibson, 2009 UT App, ¶7. The
restitution award was thus at that time a final judgment. Rule 54(b), Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, and rule 3, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
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require all judgments—including civil ones—to be final before they can be
directly appealed. The Crime Victims Restitution Act’s provision allowing
crime victims to collect restitution awards as civil judgments thus does not
change this final judgment rule. And as the Mooers court noted, the purpose
of this provision is to give victims an avenue to collect restitution owed to
them, not to invoke appellate jurisdiction. See Mooers, 2015 UT App 266,
¶¶16-17.
Likewise, Meza does not support the proposition that restitution
orders imposed as a condition of a plea in abeyance agreement can be
directly appealed. Meza addressed whether a defendant who successfully
completed a plea in abeyance and had his plea withdrawn may proceed
under the Post Conviction Remedies Act (PCRA). Meza held that he could
not because he had no conviction. 2015 UT 70, ¶¶8, 16. Meza explained that
the PRCA did not explicitly make an exception to the “general rule that a
successfully completed plea in abeyance is not a conviction.” Id. at ¶17.
The Meza court noted three “explicit exceptions” where a plea in abeyance
was treated as a conviction. Id. One of these exceptions was the Crime
Victims Restitution Act, which defines a “conviction” as a judgment of guilt,
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plea of guilty, or plea of no contest. Id. (citing Utah Code Annotated § 7738a-102(1)).7
But whether Meza correctly observed that the Crime Victims
Restitution Act treats a plea in abeyance as a conviction for restitution
purposes does not matter. Simply because the Act may treat a plea in
abeyance as a conviction for one purpose—ensuring crime victims receive
restitution—does not mean that it must be treated as a conviction for all
purposes. Indeed, Meza made clear that “except in those cases where a
statute specifically provides otherwise, a successfully completed plea in
abeyance is not a conviction and cannot be treated as such.” Id. at ¶14. The
Crime Victims Restitution Act does not purport to confer jurisdiction on
appellate courts.
But even if Gibson and Meza could be construed as supporting
Mooers’s and Becker’s position, the court of appeals correctly concluded

The two other exceptions Meza recognized were Utah Code
Annotated § 17-16-10.5(2)(c) (“Entry of a plea in abeyance is the equivalent
of a conviction for purposes of [removing public officer from office] even if
the charge is later dismissed pursuant to a plea in abeyance agreement”)
and Utah Code Annotated § 76-9-301.7(1) (“As used in this section,
‘conviction’ means a conviction by plea or by verdict, including a plea of
guilty or no contest that is held in abeyance under Title 77, Chapter 2a, Pleas
in Abeyance, regardless of whether the charge was, or is, subsequently
reduced or dismissed in accordance with the plea in abeyance agreement.”).
See Meza, 2015 UT 70, ¶17 n.3.
7
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that the language Mooers and Becker rely on was nonbinding dicta. See
Mooers, 2015 UT App 266, ¶14. Dicta are “judicial statements that are
unnecessary to the resolution of the case.” Ortega v. Ridgewood Estates, 2016
UT App 131, ¶14 n.4, __Utah Adv. Rep. __. Nonbinding, or obiter dicta,
“‘refers to a remark or expression of opinion that a court uttered as an
aside,’ such as a ‘statement made by a court for use in argument,
illustration, analogy or suggestion.’” Id. (quoting Exelon Corp. v. Department
of Revenue, 917 N.E.2d 899, 907 (Ill. 2009)). In contrast, binding, or judicial
dicta is “an expression of opinion upon a point in a case argued by counsel
and deliberately passed upon by the court,” Exelon, 917 N.E.2d at 907; for
example, a statement “‘deliberately made for the guidance of the bench and
bar upon a point of statutory construction not theretofore considered by the
Supreme Court,” ex parte Harrison, 741 S.W.2d 607, 609 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987).
While the court of appeals must follow judicial dicta, it is not required
to follow orbiter dicta. Ortega, 2016 UT App 131, ¶14 n.4 See also State v.
Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 399 n.3 (Utah 1994) (providing that “lower courts are
obliged to follow . . . any ‘judicial dicta’ that may be pronounced by the
higher court”).
Gibson’s and Meza’s statements were nonbinding orbiter dicta. They
did not address the question posed here: whether a defendant can appeal
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as a matter of right a restitution order imposed as a condition of a plea in
abeyance agreement. They were merely “‘statement[s] made by a court for
use in argument, illustration, analogy or suggestion’” on another point.
Ortega, 2016 Utah App 131, ¶14 n.4 (quoting Exelon Corp., 917 N.E.2d at 907).
They thus do not control and the court of appeals correctly concluded it did
not have jurisdiction to consider Mooers’s and Becker’s appeals.
B.
Alternative methods of review are both the only
avenues of review and fair.
Defendants finally argue that the alternative methods of review are a
“poor fit” because they are discretionary.

Br.Pet. 19-20 (capitalization

removed). But appellate courts “‘cannot conjure jurisdiction.’” Collins, 2014
UT 61, ¶21 (quoting State v. Lara, 2005 UT 70, ¶10). Their power to review
an appeal exists only by a statutory or constitutional grant. Clark, 2011 UT
23, ¶6. There is none here that gives the court of appeals power to review
non-final restitution conditions on direct appeal.
But defendants like Mooers and Becker are not wholly foreclosed
from appellate review. They can timely move to withdraw their pleas and
appeal the denial of that motion. See Utah Code Annotated § 77-13-6 (West
Supp. 2012) (allowing defendants to move to withdraw their plea in plea in
abeyance context 30 days after pleading).

They can seek interlocutory

review of the trial court’s restitution order under rule 5, Utah Rules of
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Appellate Procedure.

See Utah R. App. P. 5 (providing mechanism for

appellate review of non-final orders). And if interlocutory review is
foreclosed by law, they can seek extraordinary relief under rule 65B, Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure. And while both are discretionary, Mooers and
Becker cite no reason the appellate courts would be ungenerous with
granting discretionary review, especially where appellate review is unlikely
without it.
Further, they can always appeal the restitution award as a matter of
right if their convictions are entered and become final. Or, they could have
assured an appeal of right by declining a plea in abeyance in the first place.
This is eminently reasonable. A plea in abeyance “offers a defendant
the opportunity to avoid criminal penalties to which the defendant would
have otherwise been subject.” Layton City v. Stevenson, 2014 UT 37, ¶42.
“While the choice to accept judicial diversion may jeopardize a defendant’s
right to raise a legal issue, the quid pro quo is that the defendant who accepts
diversion can emerge from the process without a conviction.” Collins, 2008
WL 2579170U, *2. Indeed, a plea in abeyance is negotiated and “a trial court
may not impose [a plea in abeyance] except with the defendant’s consent.”
Norris, 47 S.W.3d at 461-463.
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In effect, by accepting a plea in abeyance agreement, Mooers and
Becker agreed to waive their right to a direct appeal of their restitution
conditions.

Cf. State v. Taufui, 2015 UT App 118, ¶15 (explaining that

Taufui’s guilty plea operated “as a waiver of the right to a direct appeal of
the conviction on the crime charged”); Gailey, 2016 UT 35, ¶2 (same); Utah
Code Ann. § 77-13-6(c) (providing that “any challenge to guilty plea not
made within” thirty days of pleading guilty cannot be directly appealed but
“shall” be pursued through the PCRA); State v. Nicholls I, 2006 UT 76, ¶6
(holding that because Nicholls’ challenge to guilty plea was outside the
statutory time period, any challenge “can only be pursued under” the
PCRA.). That waiver purchased for them a guarantee of no conviction for
their admitted criminal acts so long as they fulfill their obligations under the
plea agreements. They cannot be now heard to complain.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm the judgment of
the Court of Appeals.
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